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Abstract: We demonstrate a 4,294,967,296-ary quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) 
based Y-00 quantum stream cipher system carrying 160-Gb/s 16-QAM signal transmitted over 
320-km SSMF. The ultra-dense QAM cipher template is realized by an integrated two-segment 
silicon photonics I/Q modulator.  
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1. Introduction 
Fiber-optic transmission systems are susceptible to eavesdropping and require encryption for 
sensitive data. Fiber-optic cables are typically readily accessible and can be tapped using, e.g., 
evanescent coupling at an intentionally introduced fiber bend [1]. So far, the only known way 
to achieve perfect security which is fundamentally immune to all kinds of attacks is the one-
time-pad (OTP) based on a fundamentally secure key, as may be established using quantum 
key distribution (QKD) [2]. However, OTP encryption requires the key to have the same length 
as the data/plaintext, which limits the data rate to the key distribution rate. Instead of 
implementing a perfectly secure system, practically secure schemes are often used. For 
instance, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a practically secure scheme applied in 
application layer. With AES, security attacks (e.g. brute force attacks on the key) are possible 
but are computationally hard. Besides the higher layer encryption, physical-layer encryption 
[3-9] that combines unavoidable physical randomness (noise) with suitable algorithms can also 
allow practical security. For instance, the Y-00 quantum stream cipher [3,6-8] is one of the 
physical layer encryption schemes that uses inevitable quantum noise/shot noise at detection to 
mask the information. The scheme relies on an encryption algorithm to convert a lower-order 
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) original constellation to an ultra-dense higher-order 
QAM constellation, which together with fundamental shot noise in photodetection makes 
recovery of the information impossible without the key. A crucial design parameter of the Y-
00 cipher scheme is the encrypted QAM size. The higher the order of the ultra-dense 
modulation is chosen that the original data is converted to, the more security the system can 
provide. So far, the largest demonstrated encrypted QAM size is 1,048,576 (=220) QAM with 
low-speed 10-bit DACs at a symbol rate of 5 GBaud and line rate of 70 Gb/s [9].  
In this paper, we design an integrated two-segment silicon photonics (SiPh) I/Q modulator 
which allows cascaded modulation via two sets of DACs and drivers. This dramatically 
increases the modulation order and greatly enhances the security of the Y-00 scheme. We show 
that we can generate a 4,294,967,296 (=232) QAM based Y-00 ciphertext that carries 22-GBaud 
16-QAM information at 160-Gb/s physical-layer secure net rate with 320-km standard single 
mode fiber (SSMF) transmission. 
2. Y-00 Stream Cipher and Device Design 
The Y-00 quantum stream cipher achieves secure data transmission via two steps: i) at the 
transmitter, an encryption algorithm with a short seed key (e.g. 256 bits) is used to convert a 
low-order QAM signal to an ultra-dense QAM waveform; ii) upon photodetection, shot noise 
introduces detection uncertainties on the waveform. With a sufficient number of amplitude 
levels on each quadrature of the ultra-dense QAM constellation, the noise induced uncertainties 
can lead to a symbol error ratio (SER) closely approaching 1 [10]. Given the coding of data bits 
is cyclically shifted and there is sufficient randomization on the amplitudes in the Y-00 
encryption algorithm, SER of 1 in such a system will result a bit error ratio (BER) closely 
approaching 0.5 [11], meaning that the eavesdropper (Eve) has no other choice except for pure 
guessing. Only the legitimate user (Bob) who has the key can decrypt the waveform to the 
original low-order QAM signal for error-free detection. We assume that the short seed key is 
safe and can be delivered via a separate, highly secure distribution system such as QKD. The 
conversion from low-order QAM (e.g. 16-QAM in this demonstration) to ultra-dense QAM 
(e.g. 4,294,967,296-QAM) is done as illustrated in Fig. 1 (a). The seed key is sent into two 
pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to generate two sets of practically unrepeated key 
streams (e.g. a 256-bit seed key generates a keystream with a period of 2256-1). The key stream 
from PRNG1 runs an exclusive OR (XOR) logic on the plaintext, and the one from PRNG2 is 
used for randomizing the amplitude levels via a basis combination algorithm. Details of the 
algorithm can be found in Ref. [7]. For each polarization, the original 4-bits 16-QAM plaintext 
is randomized into 32 bits and generate a 4,294,967,296 (= 232) QAM ciphertext symbol.  
 
Fig. 1 (a) Block diagram for the Y-00 encryption algorithm; (b) Theoretical calculation on 
Eve’s SER as a function of the QAM size. 
To understand how large the QAM size needs to be in order to be masked by shot noise, a 
theoretical calculation is done following Ref. [12], with results shown in Fig. 1 (b). We examine 
Eve’s SER at two critical power levels, i) -10 dBm which is a typical power level after an 
optical modulator; and ii) -2 dBm which is the optimal launch power for our 160 Gb/s signal at 
the begging of each fiber span. It can be seen that with only shot noise, an Eve’s SER can be 
made to only 0.36 at the highest by an 8-bit transmitter that can generate 28×28 QAM at most 
(the red star in Fig. 1 (b)). A 10-bit transmitter (the orange star in Fig. 1 (b)) would help 
increasing the SER, which is however still limited to 0.93. With our two-segment SiPh I/Q 
modulator, the nominal number of bits can be doubled. In other words, two 8-bit DACs can be 
used for each quadrature to produce a 16-bit transmitter which allows a cipher template of 
4,294,967,296 (= 2(8+8)×2(8+8)) QAM.  
A schematic diagram of the two-segment modulator is shown in Fig. 2 (a). As seen, the I/Q 
modulator consists of two Mach-Zehnder modulators (MZMs). Each MZM is formed by two 
waveguide phase shifters with embedded reverse-biased PN junctions in a push-pull 
configuration. The electrode for the phase shifter consists of two segments driven by two 
independent DACs. Each segment is 3 mm long and has a Vπ of ~6V. The inset to Fig. 2 (a) 
shows an example of modulating QPSK on each segment to generate a 16-QAM signal. A photo 
of the modulator chip is shown in Fig. 2 (b). 
 
Fig. 2 (a) Schematic diagram of the two-segment SiPh I/Q modulator; (b) a photo of the 
modulator chip.  
3. Experimental Setup 
With the two-segment I/Q modulator, we demonstrate the transmission of a 22-GBaud 16-
QAM signal encrypted into a 4,294,967,296-QAM Y-00 quantum stream ciphertext. The 
experimental setup is shown in Fig. 3. The transmitter consists of a 1-kHz linewidth laser 
operating at 1550.1 nm [13] and the two-segment SiPh I/Q modulator. The modulator uses a 
laser input power of 17.5 dBm and the transmitter generates an output power of -16.5 dBm. 
The high loss is due to the packaging and the relatively high Vπ of this experimental device. 
The DACs have a nominal resolution of 8 bits, and operate at 88 GSa/s. The electrical driver 
amplifiers have a gain of 23 dB. Polarization-division multiplexing (PDM) is realized by a 
fiber-delay based PDM emulator with 10.9 meters of decorrelation delay (i.e., 54.5 ns or 1199 
symbols). The transmission fiber is 4 spans of 80-km dispersion-uncompensated SSMF. The 
signal launch power is -2 dBm. The inset of Fig. 3 shows the signal spectrum at the transmitter 
(blue) and the receiver (orange). The received signal is detected by an integrated coherent 
receiver (ICR) [14] with input optical power of –10 dBm. The optical signal-to-noise ratio 
(OSNR) before and after fiber transmission is 36 dB and 29.3 dB. The free-running local 
oscillator has a 1-kHz linewidth and is kept to within a frequency offset of ~300 MHz relative 
to the transmit laser. The ICR has integrated transimpedance amplifiers (TIAs) and generates 
electrical signals with peak-to-peak voltage of ~320 mV. The electrical signal is sampled by a 
real-time scope operating at 80 GSa/s with 8 nominal bits and electrical bandwidth of 32 GHz.  
The digital signal processing (DSP) procedures are shown in Fig. 4 (a) and (b). At the 
transmitter, every 4 information bits (one 16-QAM symbol) generates a 32-bits (232-QAM) 
constellation point. No Nyquist pulse shaping is used, as it increases the required number of 
bits from the DACs. We aim to utilize all the 16-bit resolution for the ultra-dense QAM 
encryption. For each quadrature, the 16 bits [b16, b15, …, b2, b1] for the in-phase part of the 232-
QAM waveform are split into two 8-bit groups, the even-indexed bits [b16, b14…, b2] and the 
odd-indexed bits [b15, b13,  …, b1] for two DACs. This results in 6-dB higher RF driving power 
on the 1st segment than on the 2nd segment. The RF power on the two segments are carefully 
adjusted by RF attenuators and gain-tunable drivers. At the receiver, coherent DSP such as 
dispersion compensation and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) adaptive filtering are 
done. The MIMO filter has 121 taps, and uses least mean square (LMS) algorithm with a digital 
phase locked (digital PLL) inside. The first 5000 symbols are used for pre-convergence, and 
then 3% pilot symbols are used for assisting the channel and phase estimation. After the MIMO 
filtering, the Y-00 decryption recovers the 16-QAM and binary bits in a symbol-by-symbol 
amplitude subtraction fashion [7] as illustrated in Fig. 4 (c). A BER is calculated with 9.46 
million received bits of the 16-QAM user information.  
 Fig. 3. Experimental setup for 22-GBaud 16-QAM signal with 4,294,967,296-QAM 
Y-00 quantum stream cipher encryption.  
Note that our DACs have a limited memory of 218 samples which is significantly less than 
the number of points in a 232-QAM constellation. The 232-QAM constellation therefore contains 
only a random subset of the 232 possible constellation points within this experiment. We 
emphasize that the encryption security of this work is ensured by the massive number and 
density of all possible points in the cipher constellation template, and this is independent of 
what subset of the points is actually selected by encryption in our measured time window. In 
fact, our encryption scheme generates ultra-dense constellation points uniformly at random, 
and our measurement confirms that loading different random subsets of 232 constellation points 
affect neither the BER for Bob’s 16-QAM signal nor the SER for Eve’s 232-QAM waveform. 
In a real system where the bit stream has no cycle, measuring the whole 232-QAM constellation 
can be done by increasing the observation time.  
 
Fig. 4. Digital signal processing procedures for (a) transmitter and (b) receiver; (c) block diagram for the 
Y-00 decryption algorithm. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
We keep the cipher template at 232 QAM and measure the BER of the 22-GBaud 16-QAM 
signal as a function of ONSR at optical back-to-back setting. The results are shown in Fig. 5. 
A regular 22-GBaud 16-QAM signal without encryption is also measured for comparison. 
Assuming 7% hard-decision forward error correction (HD-FEC) with a BER threshold of 
3.9×10-3, the required OSNRs are 23 dB for the regular 16-QAM signal and 24 dB for the 
encrypted 16-QAM. The resulting net data rate is (22 GBaud×16 QAM×2 pol. /(1 + 7% FEC 
overhead + 3% pilot)) = 160 Gb/s. Note that the Y-00 encryption scheme can also work with 
soft-decision FEC (SD-FEC), if FEC decoding is incorporated in the basis separation function. 
The constellations before and after the decryption at an OSNR of 36 dB are shown in Fig. 5. 
The BER after 320-km SSMF transmission is 2.5×10-3, shown as the red dot in Fig. 5.  
In order to verify the effectiveness of noise masking with our increased QAM size, we 
measure the SER for Eve as a function of QAM size. We give Eve access to the two best places 
for tapping (c.f. Fig. 3): i) Point A, after data modulation and before the first EDFA, where the 
optical power may be weak but the amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise is the smallest; 
and ii) Point B, after the first EDFA where the optical power is strong but the signal is corrupted 
by ASE. The measured SER is shown in Fig. 6. We can observe that, although our system is 
impaired not only by shot noise but also by other noise such as thermal noise and analog-to-
digital (ADC) quantization noise, no cipher template smaller than 224 QAM can make Eve’s 
SER higher than 99.98%. A 224 QAM template requires 12 bits per quadrature, which exceed 
what commercial high-speed CMOS DACs can offer.     
 
Fig. 5. Measured BER as a function of OSNR for the 22-GBaud 16-QAM signals 
with and without the encryption. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Measured symbol error ratio as a function of QAM template size at 
eavesdropping point A & B. 
5. Conclusions 
We demonstrated a 4,294,967,296-QAM based Y-00 quantum stream cipher system carrying a 
160-Gb/s net rate physical-layer secure signal. The ultra-dense QAM cipher signal generation 
is realized by our two-segment SiPh I/Q modulator driven by two sets of independent DACs 
with an aggregate nominal resolution of 16 bits per quadrature. The demonstrated encrypted 
QAM template is (232 /220 =) 4,096 times larger than the previous demonstration (220 QAM), 
and the symbol rate is (22 GBaud/5 GBaud =) 4.4 times higher than the previous demonstration 
[9]. 
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